Pirate States? State responsibility in the context of piracy An inquiry into the possibility of attributing acts of piracy to States by De Almeida Santos, Gabriel Luis
 Pirate States? State 
responsibility in the context of 
piracy 
An inquiry into the possibility of attributing acts of piracy to States  
Candidate number: 5064 
Submission deadline: 1/11/2015 
Number of words: 17.866 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
I 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ………………………………………………………………III 
1. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………...............1 
    1.1. Scope and structure of the thesis ……..………………………………………...………2 
    1.2. Methodology used in the study…………………………………………………………3 
2. ON THE DEFINITION OF PIRACY………………………………………………….…….6 
    2.1. The definition of piracy under the Law of the Sea...........................................................6 
         2.1.1. The elements within the definition of piracy under the Law of the Sea.................6 
    2.2. Concluding remarks..........................................................................................................8 
3. STATES AND PIRACY........................................................................................................10 
    3.1. Pirate States: a thing of the past......................................................................................10 
    3.2. Piracy today....................................................................................................................11 
           3.2.1. The root of the problem........................................................................................11 
                     3.2.1.1. State involvement in piracy.....................................................................11 
    3.3. Concluding remarks........................................................................................................13 
4. STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF PIRACY...........................................14 
4.1. General on State responsibility in international law.......................................................14 
    4.2. On the impossibility of attributing piratical acts to States..............................................21 
           4.2.1. Excluding state-sanctioned acts from the UNCLOS definition 
                     of piracy: the historical path of the private ends requirement..............................22 
           4.2.2. The role of the private ends requirement and of the other requirements within 
                      the UNCLOS definition of piracy regarding issues of attribution.......................25 
  
II 
                      4.2.2.1. The function of the private ends requirement in the 
                                   characterization of  pirates as non-state actors.......................................25 
                       4.2.2.2. The other effect of the private ends requirement: is there a specific 
                                   obligation prohibiting State piracy in international law?.......................27 
    4.3. Alternatives for holding the State directly responsible for acts 
            that would be piratical, if not for the mark of authority.................................................29 
           4.3.1. Grounds for the prohibition of unauthorized 
                     acts of violence at sea in international law...........................................................29 
           4.3.2. Is SUA an alternative in this context?..................................................................32 
           4.3.3. The Hostages Convention alternative...................................................................33 
    4.4. Attributing piratical acts to States in an indirect manner...............................................34  
     4.4.1. Grounds for holding States indirectly responsible for piracy................................35 
           4.4.2. The due diligence standard and the obligation  
                     to prevent in the context of piracy........................................................................37 
                      4.4.2.1. Distinguishing between obligations of conduct subject to 
                                  a due diligence standard and pure obligations to prevent.......................40 
                      4.4.2.2. The due diligence standard and the counter-piracy operations  
                                   off the Somali Coast: are States obliged to accept help?........................41 
                      4.4.2.3. The dry aspect of piracy: external help from naval operations does not  
                                   discharge a State from the obligation to prevent pirate attacks………..44 
    4.5. Concluding remarks........................................................................................................45 
5. CONCLUSION.....................................................................................................................48 
TABLE OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................49 
 
  
III 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  
ARSIWA: Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation 
CTF-151: Combined Task Force 151 
EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone 
EU NAVFOR: European Union Naval Force Somalia Operation Atalanta 
FGS: Federal Government of Somalia 
HSC: Convention on the High Seas 
ICJ: International Court of Justice 
ILC: International Law Commission 
IMO: International Maritime Organization 
ITLOS: International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
PCIJ: Permanent Court of International Justice 
ReCCAP: Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships in Asia 
RIB-DELTA: Rapid Intervention Battalion 
SUA: Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation 
TFG: Transitional Federal Government of Somalia 
UN: United Nations 
  
IV 
UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
UNSC: United Nations Security Council 
VCLT: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
 
  
1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Piracy is a global phenomenon: an International Maritime Organization (IMO) report 
advances that in 2013 there were alleged incidents of piracy in areas ranging from the 
Arabian Sea, the South China Sea, and West Africa to South America
1
. Piracy has been 
attributed to the largely lawless space of the sea, favorable geography, coastal communities 
that cannot defend themselves, and economic instability. Another factor attributed to 
piracy is the financial profit stemming whether from ransoms paid in order to free hostages 
or from the act of selling stolen cargo or vessels. Moreover, corrupt officialdom and weak 
or compliant States function as breeding grounds for piracy
2
. 
Yet, although some States can be like sanctuaries for pirates, it seems inappropriate to refer 
to them as pirate States
3. This is because the term “State” evokes an image of authority; 
while piracy, on the other hand, has been commonly associated with the rejection of State 
institutions
4. In the words of a pirate captain: “I am a free prince and have as much 
authority to make war on the whole world as he who has a hundred sail of ships and an 
army of a hundred thousand men in the field”5. 
The view stressing that the State cannot be held responsible for acts of piracy seems to be 
anchored to the above-mentioned aspect of piracy. As one international law commentator 
argued a long time ago:  
Piracy includes acts differing much from each other in kind and 
in moral value; but one thing they all have in common: they are 
done under conditions which render it impossible or unfair to 
hold any state responsible for their commission. A pirate either 
belongs to no State or organised political society, or by the nature 
                                                          
1
 IMO Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report – 2013. MSC. 4/Circ. 
208.  1 March 2013. Annex 2. p. 1.   
2
 Martin N. Murphy. Small Boats Weak States Dirty Money. Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern 
World. UK:  C. Hurst and Co Ltd. 2010. p. 21. 
3
 Ibid. p. 54. 
4
 Janice E. Thompson. Mercenaries, pirates and sovereigns: state-building and extraterritorial violence in 
early modern Europe. New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1994. p. 46. 
5
 Frank Sherry. Raiders & Rebels A History of the Golden Age of Piracy. US: Harper Collins. 2008. p. 126. 
Emphasis on the original. 
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of his act he has shown his intention and his power to reject the 
authority of that to which he is properly subject
6
.  
Currently, there appears to be a consensus among commentators on the issue that piratical 
acts cannot be attributed to States under the rules on the responsibility of States for 
internationally wrongful acts
7
. Such a common ground is based on an interpretation of the 
private ends requirement within the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)
8
 definition of piracy, excluding all state-sanctioned acts of violence at sea from 
the category of piratical ones. According to such an interpretation, if there is public interest 
behind an act of violence at sea, the latter will not be committed for private ends and in 
turn will not be considered piratical
9
.  
1.1. Scope and structure of the thesis 
Notwithstanding such an interpretation, State authorities can be directly involved in piracy. 
Hence, the study has two major objectives: 
a) Investigate why it is impossible to directly attribute piratical acts to States. 
b) Analyze the possibility of indirectly attributing such acts to States.  
Bearing this in mind, the thesis is divided in two distinct approaches. One of them does not 
specifically deal with the issue of the State responsibility regarding acts of piracy and is 
organized into three chapters. The first of the latter comprises a short presentation of the 
topic, followed by the statement of the scope of the study, and an explanation on the 
methodology.  In the second chapter, there is an analysis of the UNCLOS definition of 
piracy, in order to clarify which acts can be reputed as piratical under international law. 
After defining such acts, attention is drawn not to the acts of pirates, but to that of States in 
the context of piracy. Thus, the third chapter of the study comprises comments on past and 
present manifestations of State involvement in piracy.  
                                                          
6
  William Edward Hall A Treatise on International Law.  7th edition. ed. Alexander Pearce Higgins. The 
Clarendon Press. 1917. p. 267. 
7
 Alexander Proelss. Piracy and the Use of Force, in The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea European and 
International Perspectives. ed. Panos Koutrakos and Achilles Skordas. United Kingdom: Hart Publishing. 
2014. p. 53. 
8
 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted in Montego Bay, 10 December 1982. 
UNCLOS, Article 101. 
9
 Robin GeiB. Anna Petrig. Piracy and Armed Robbery at sea The Legal Framework for Counter-Piracy 
Operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. New York: Oxford University Press. 2011. p. 61. 
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Following this important approach on piracy and States, the second part comprises the 
fourth and also the longest chapter of the thesis, which is devoted to the responsibility of 
States under international law in the context of piracy.  
The chapter was arranged into five parts. The first gives a presentation on the general 
aspects governing the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. It is 
followed by an analysis on the impossibility of directly attributing piratical acts to States. 
Therein, the focus is on the role that the private ends requirement within the UNCLOS 
definition of piracy plays in the context of this impossibility. Furthermore, alternatives are 
suggested in order to hold States responsible for acts of violence at sea which are not 
piratical. Subsequently, the fourth part addresses the possibility of attributing piratical acts 
to States in an indirect manner. This happens, for instance, if a State violates the obligation 
to prevent a pirate attack. In addition, this obligation is analyzed in the context of the use 
of external help aiming to combat piracy. Finally, concluding remarks on this second 
approach are given, followed by an overall conclusion on the entire study. 
1.2. Methodology used in the study 
The study approaches the topic in a legal perspective. That is to say, questions related to 
international politics were intentionally ignored. Notwithstanding, international law can be 
influenced by politics
10
. Particularly in the context of State responsibility and politics, for 
example, an injured State may choose not to bring a claim against another State for failing 
to prevent a pirate attack, lest straining a stable economic relationship.  
Unfortunately, the research on the legal literature concerning State responsibility and 
piracy revealed a lack of information on the topic. Thus, studies on State responsibility in 
the context of terrorism and armed opposition groups were used to support the analysis. 
However, such a support was provided on a general basis. Piracy, terrorism and armed 
opposition groups are distinct phenomena, but general aspects on State responsibility 
                                                          
10
 Michael Byers. Custom Power and the Power of Rules. International Relations and Customary 
International Law. UK: Cambridge University Press. 1999. p.4. 
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concerning non-state actors can be applied to pirates, since they are included in the 
category of individuals not acting by or on behalf of a State
11
. 
Along with these sources, articles and books on piracy were used in order to basis the 
analysis on the private ends element within the UNCLOS definition of piracy. Few of these 
texts addressed the State involvement in piratical acts. Even when such sources focused on 
the political aspects entangled with the issue of State and piracy, attention was drawn only 
to the legal analysis therein. 
The study sought also to interpret legal instruments, such as treaties, to make a distinction 
between the different types of violence at sea and determine in which cases these acts of 
violence could be directly or indirectly attributable to States, even where such acts were 
not considered to be piratical.  
These legal instruments also provided the tools to establish the function of the private ends 
element when assessing the possibility of attributing piratical acts to States. In this context, 
the crime of genocide was used as an example
12
 to illustrate ways of attributing illicit acts 
to States. Nevertheless, the study kept in mind that genocide and piracy are different acts 
of violence. 
Drafts and declarations are not sources of international law per se
13
. Nonetheless, these 
documents may, for instance, reflect customary international law. Therefore, such 
instruments composed the material for the study.  
Judicial decisions, concerning well-known cases brought to international tribunals, such as 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), were used either to provide 
the grounds to the arguments advanced or to reinforce the interpretation of the legal 
instruments to be found in the thesis. 
                                                          
11
 Natalie Klein. Maritime Security, in The Oxford Handbook of The Law of the Sea. ed. Donald R. Rothwell 
et al.  UK: Oxford University Press. 2015. p. 595. 
12
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations 9 December 1948. 
13
 According to Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, international conventions, 
international custom and general principles of law are the main sources of international law; the subsidiary 
ones are judicial decisions and legal doctrine. 
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To substantiate such a legal insight, adding facts supporting the alleged involvement of 
States in piracy, the study also resorted to reports produced by international organizations, 
such as the United Nations (UN) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (The World Bank). Along with these reports, news from different sources 
complemented the factual basis for the mentioned analysis. 
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2. ON THE DEFINITION OF PIRACY  
2.1. The definition of piracy under the Law of the Sea 
According to Article 101 of UNCLOS, which is considered to represent the existing 
customary law on the topic
14
, piracy can be defined as:  
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed:  
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property 
on board such ship or aircraft;  
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of 
any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or 
(b).  
2.1.1. The elements within the definition of piracy under the Law of the Sea 
It is important to analyze the elements within the definition of piracy under UNCLOS. This 
is because there have been some misinterpretations, contributing to labeling as piracy acts 
of violence at sea which could not be reputed as such under international law
15
. Bearing 
this in mind, it can be stated that this definition consists of five elements: 
The first one is the perpetration of “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation”. Although the presence of violence is essential to the definition, there is no 
                                                          
14
 Yoshifumi Tanaka. The International Law of the Sea. United States: Cambridge University Press. 2012. p. 
355. 
15
 Douglas Guilfoyle. Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea. United States: Cambridge University 
Press. 2009. p. 31. 
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indication in Article 101 regarding the types of violent conducts that could characterize an 
act of piracy. Thus, the acts of hijacking ships, along with the crew on board, could be 
considered piracy under international law. However, it is important to emphasize that 
attempts do not fall under the definition of Article 101
16
. On the other hand, acts of inciting 
or intentionally facilitating the conducts aforementioned would be piratical, as well as 
voluntarily participating in the operation of a ship or aircraft, with knowledge of their use 
for piracy. Lastly, the reference to an illegality seems unnecessary, since it could be 
difficult to imagine how these acts could be legal, except perhaps in a situation where force 
was used in self-defense
17
.  
Secondly, these illegal acts of violence, detention or depredation must be perpetrated for 
“private ends”. Most commentators agree that acts carried out under the authority of States 
would be excluded from the definition of piracy; others think that also politically-
motivated acts, such as terrorism at sea, cannot be deemed piratical
18
. The former view is 
important for the study and, therefore, is analyzed in depth elsewhere
19
. 
Acts of violence at sea are piratical only if committed for private ends and if the 
perpetrators use private ships or aircrafts. According to Article 102 of UNCLOS, if the 
crew of a warship or a government ship or aircraft has mutinied and taken control of the 
ship, the acts of piracy committed by such a crew are assimilated to those perpetrated by a 
private ship. In other words, the ship does not lose its public nature, but is deprived of its 
public purpose. In this vein, Article 103 of UNCLOS prescribes that an aircraft or a ship 
are pirate if they are intended to or have been used to commit acts of piracy by the people 
in dominant control and for the whole period where this control remains. Furthermore, the 
rule on Article 102 provides the ground for lifting the immunity of governmental and war 
vessels, to make Article 105 and Article 110 applicable in these cases
20
. Article 105 deals 
with the seizure of pirate ships or aircrafts. Article 110 concerns the right to visit.  
                                                          
16
 Tanaka. The International Law of the Sea. p. 355. 
17
 Robin Churchill. The Piracy Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea – Fit for Purpose? in 
The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea European and International Perspectives. p. 13. 
18
 Ibid, p.16.  
19
 See Chapter 4, Section 4.2. 
20
 Satya N. Nandan C.B.E., Shabtai Rosenne, Neal R. Grandy. United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea 1982 a commentary Vol III articles 86 to 132 and documentary annexes. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers. 1995. p. 205. 
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In addition, the acts of violence must be committed against another ship or aircraft, 
requiring the involvement of two ships. In an interesting case, which occurred in 1961, the 
Portuguese liner Santa Maria was taken over by members already on board of the ship, led 
by Captain Galvão, seeking to free Portugal from Salazar´s dictatorship. The incident 
became known as the Santa Maria affair
21
. Such an act cannot be piratical under Article 
101 of UNCLOS, even if politically-motivated acts are considered to be under the 
requirement of private ends, because it lacks the two-ship requirement. 
Lastly, piracy involves acts of violence committed on the high seas or in a no-jurisdiction 
zone, such as Antarctica. In this respect, Article 58 (2) of UNCLOS states that Articles 88 
to 115 of the treaty, encompassing those relating to piracy, are applicable to the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ), provided that they are not incompatible with the EEZ rules. Since 
there is no incompatibility between the rules on piracy and the ones applicable to the EEZ, 
acts of violence committed in the latter may be considered piratical. In light of this, acts 
committed within the internal and archipelagic waters of a State, or its territorial Sea, 
would be armed robbery
22
, and not piracy, even if such acts fulfill the other requirements. 
2.2. Concluding remarks 
The UNCLOS definition of piracy has been criticized on account of its inadequacy to 
address all acts of violence at sea
23
. Despite the criticism, this definition is considered to 
reflect customary international law and has been adopted by regional agreements aiming to 
combat piracy and armed robbery, such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct
24
, and the 
ReCCAP
25
. Hence, the study uses this definition when addressing the issue of the 
international responsibility of States in the context of piracy. 
                                                          
21
 United Press International Liner´s Plight Recalls 1961 Ship Seizure: Crew Member Killed When 
Portuguese Rebels Staged Hijack. October 08 1985.  http://articles.latimes.com/1985-10-08/news/mn-
15288_1_crew-members.   
22
 According the IMO Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships (2009). Resolution A.1025 (26). 2.2. (1) (2). 
23
 Churchill. The Piracy Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea – Fit for Purpose? p. 22. 
24
 Article 1 (1) of the Resolution 1, adopted on 29 January 2009, Adoption of the Code of Conduct 
Concerning the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the 
Gulf of Aden. 
25
 Article 1 (1) of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships in Asia (ReCCAP). 
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Despite the fact that States have been engaged in initiatives to combat piracy, some of 
them continue to provide a fertile environment for illegal activities such as piracy. 
Therefore, the following chapter deals with the causes for piracy and the manners in which 
a State can become involved. 
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3. STATES AND PIRACY 
3.1. Pirate States: a thing of the past 
In the past, States sponsored acts of violence and plundering at sea and those who 
committed these acts were not pirates, but privateers.  Some of these acts were perpetrated 
without a license issued by a State, which characterized piracy. Privateering and, in some 
cases piracy, were an important source of income to Great Britain, for instance. Francis 
Drake, a famous British privateer, was even knighted by Queen Elizabeth
26
. Although it 
was significant in the past, privateering has been abolished.
27
 
While some States resorted to privateering and benefited from piracy, labeling them pirates 
would not be accurate. However, there is a historical account of an organization which 
resembled a pirate state: the “pirate nation” of Madagascar. In the 17th Century, pirates 
settled in the island of Madagascar, and gradually developed their own food, customs, 
language and flag. Their pirate ships also followed a consistent set of rules, detailing the 
crew´s rights and duties
28. The “pirate nation” disappeared around the year 1701, after the 
British navy was dispatched and most pirates accepted an amnesty offer. Later, by the War 
of the Spanish Succession, former pirates based in Madagascar became privateers, because 
at the time Great Britain employed privateering against French and Spanish ships
29
. 
Nowadays, whereas piracy is still an issue, neither do “pirate nations” nor privateering 
exist anymore. It seems more appropriate to argue that instead of pirate states, the modern 
world deals with States which serve as breeding grounds for piracy. 
                                                          
26
 Jon Latimer. Buccaneers of the Caribbean How Piracy Forged an Empire. United States: Cambridge 
University Press. 2009. p. 17.  
27
 Article 1. The Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law.  Paris, 16 April 1856. 
28
 Thompson. Mercenaries, pirates and sovereigns: state-building and extraterritorial violence in early 
modern Europe. p. 48. 
29
 Ibid, p. 49. 
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3.2. Piracy today 
3.2.1. The root of the problem  
According to UNCLOS, most of the incidents reported are not piracy, because they happen 
within the territorial waters of States, a few miles from the coast
30
. Thus, in the modern 
world, armed robbery happens more than piracy. Nonetheless, the causes of both piracy 
and the former are the same. Among these causes are the wide lawless space of the sea, 
favorable geography and economic disruption, which opens the market for stolen goods. 
Also, the financial profit stemming from the act of selling stolen cargo or the ransom paid 
for hostages taken. Additionally, there is the capacity deficit of some coastal communities 
to defend themselves. Lastly, corrupt officials, who benefit from piracy and armed robbery, 
protect pirates and provide a sanctuary for these acts of violence at sea
31
.   
3.2.1.1. State involvement in piracy  
State involvement in piracy and armed robbery can occur in ways including financial 
support for pirates, and opening bank accounts for them and facilitating financial 
operations. Allowing pirates to invest their money in both legal and illegal activities and 
launder their money. Furthermore, the local police and the local authorities may protect 
pirates, shielding the latter against investigations and prosecutions. Finally, local 
authorities may provide infrastructure, in order for pirates to accommodate the stolen ship, 
cargo or hostages.  
According to a report by the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia, financial 
support for pirates could be coming from local authorities within the Federal Government 
of Somalia (FGS) and those authorities could also be involved with ransom-payment 
negotiations
32
. The report has identified money transfers and bank accounts belonging to 
pirate leaders, investors and facilitators. These financial transactions involve individuals 
                                                          
30
 Murphy. Small Boats Weak States Dirty Money. Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World.  p. 
17. 
31
 Ibid. p. 21. 
32
 UN Documents for Somalia. The Monitoring´s group final report on Somalia. S/2014/726. 10 October 
2014. pp. 106-107. 
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from both inside and outside Somalia, including holders of senior positions within the 
FGS
33
. 
It is not surprising that local authorities are involved in piracy and armed robbery in 
Somalia. These activities are lucrative and involve many people. In 2008, for instance, a 
BBC analyst for Africa, Mary Harper, stressed that the Puntland-based town, Eyl, was a 
safe-haven were little was done to stop pirates, implying that some local authorities could 
be involved. The entire community seemed connected to piracy and armed robbery, given 
that even restaurants were set up to serve food for hostages
34
.  
Along with holders of senior positions in a State, other authorities can also become 
involved in piracy and armed robbery. Police officers can provide protection for pirates. In 
Belakang Padang, off the coast of Batam, Indonesia, it has been reported that the local 
police served as bodyguards for pirates. Moreover, local authorities, including the 
Indonesian Navy, were also involved, and turned a blind eye to the problem
35
.  
Naval officers could also be involved in piracy and armed robbery. In Nigeria, it has been 
alleged that naval officers control a handful of security companies, which in turn assign 
Nigerian Navy ratings to provide security for visiting foreign cargo vessels. In such 
arrangements, the officers gain a commission. Some of the officers may also be directly 
involved in piracy and armed robbery. It has been alleged that Nigerian naval officers own 
pirate tanker fleets, to where stolen oil cargo is transferred. Following the commitment of 
crude oil theft, an illegal activity that has taken place in the Gulf of Guinea, off the coast of 
Nigeria and Benin
36
. 
Lastly, port and coastal authorities can also be involved with pirates, living off the rewards 
gained from the stolen cargo and helping pirates to anchor stolen ships. In Somalia, it has 
been claimed that hostile clans have taken control of some ports
37
. 
                                                          
33
 Ibid. p. 174. 
34
 BBC. Life in Somalia´s Pirate Town. 18 of September 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7623329.stm 
35 Jakarta Post. “Indonesia key to end piracy in Malacca Straits”. 6 August 2006. 
http://rafflesia.wwf.or.id/library/admin/attachment/clips/2006-08-06-008-0003-001-07-0935.pdf. 
36
 Business Insider. Kremlin seeks London sanctions for Nigerian navy in Myre Seadiver case. 25 March 
2013.  http://www.businessinsider.com/kremlin-seeks-london-sanctions-for-nigerian-navy-in-myre-seadiver-
case-2013-3. 
37
 Peter Lehr and Hendrick Lehman. Somalia – pirates´ new paradise, in Violence at Sea, Piracy in the Age of 
Global Terrorism. ed. Peter Lehr. New York: Routledge. 2007. p. 20.  
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3.3. Concluding remarks 
In the past, States openly sponsored acts of violence at sea, through the practice of 
privateering, which was eventually abolished. It appears exaggerated to refer to them as 
pirate States. Privateering was a legal activity and this aspect distinguished it from piracy. 
The closest example of a pirate State would be the Madagascar-based “pirate nation”, but it 
also disappeared. 
Today, State involvement in armed robbery and piracy can take many forms. It ranges 
from financial support to the direct participation of state officials in these activities. 
However, it seems far-fetched to conclude that these activities are part of the structure of 
these States. Despite the fact that both local authorities and the local community benefit 
from piracy and armed robbery in the States prone to these activities, labeling them as 
pirates is inappropriate. Even when local authorities are involved, it is not possible to 
affirm that these activities are part of the State policy. This is because they involve illegal 
acts such as taking of property or hostages. In addition, the illegal nature of such acts 
forces perpetrators and supporters to plan and carry out with these activities in secrecy. 
Hence, in cases where States act as breeding grounds for piracy, with the involvement of 
local authorities, is it possible to hold those States responsible for piratical acts under 
international law? The next chapter deals with this issue. It assesses whether States can be 
held directly responsible for piracy. In light of the impossibility of doing so, there will be 
an insight into the obstacles. The chapter also assesses whether there are alternatives to 
hold States directly responsible for these acts of violence at sea which are not piratical. 
Finally, it will analyze the possibility of holding States indirectly responsible for piratical 
acts.
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4. STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF PIRACY 
4.1. General on State responsibility in international law 
Before addressing the issue of the responsibility of States in international law in the 
context of piracy, it is important to draw attention to what are the general aspects 
governing this specific responsibility. 
The modern framework of the responsibility in question is to be found in a 2001 draft, 
which contains 59 articles on the matter, prepared by the International Law Commission 
(ILC)
38
, an organ within the UN. This draft is not per se a source of International Law
39
, 
but its articles are considered to be written customary law, as stated by the ICJ in the 
Bosnian Genocide case
40
. Moreover, its articles do not represent all the existing rules on 
the international responsibility of States and have a residual nature, rendering them 
inapplicable where special rules must apply
41
. Lastly, the referred articles do not apply to 
the acts of international organizations or other non-state actors. Nonetheless, they are 
applicable where the State owns an obligation whether to an individual, an international 
organization or another State
42
. 
According to the draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (hereinafter the draft or ARSIWA), in order for the State responsibility to arise, the 
State must have breached an international obligation which is attributable to it under 
International Law
43
. Furthermore, in order for a breach to happen, the State must be bound 
by the obligation when the act capable of occasioning the violation occurs
44
. Finally, it is 
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stated in the draft that every international wrongful act entails the international 
responsibility of the State
45
. 
Only a breach of an obligation characterized as international gives rise to such a 
responsibility. It is irrelevant if the conduct behind such breach is legal under domestic 
law
46
.  In this vein, the State cannot use the legality of an act under internal law to escape 
the rules of international responsibility. By the same token, the sole condition of an act 
being illegal under internal law does not necessary lead to a breach of an international 
obligation
47
. Furthermore, as long as the breached obligation is international, it does not 
matter if it stems from a treaty, a rule of customary nature or a general principle applicable 
in international law
48
.   
Although stating that the obligations breached must be international, the draft does not 
make reference to the forms which such obligations can take. As a principle of 
organization, the draft chose to adopt the distinction between primary and secondary rules 
of international law, conceived by Roberto Ago, who served as Special Rapporteur for the 
ILC Commission on international responsibility of States
49
. According to this distinction, 
primary rules would be composed of substantive international obligations, to be found in 
treaties or customary law, for example. Whereas the secondary rules would relate to state 
responsibility, seeking to establish if there was a breach of an international obligation, 
prescribed by a primary rule, and the consequences of such violation
50
. 
This distinction has not been immune to criticism: some argue that secondary rules are 
abstractions, with no practical use; others argue that the dichotomy is simplistic, since 
some primary rules may generate their own secondary rules
51
. Notwithstanding, such an 
organization was preferred over one which focused on the content of primary rules, for 
they are innumerable and impossible to codify. Along with this, such a classification 
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allows some rules on state responsibility, of secondary nature, to be developed without 
reference to a primary rule of international law
52
. 
When it comes to the conduct giving rise to a breach of an international obligation, it may 
consist of an action or an omission; the breach may be due to a singular act or a 
combination of acts
53
; the obligation may protect the interest of a particular State or that of 
the international community as a whole
54
; depending on the content of the international 
obligation at issue. Some obligations may impose a duty of prevention on the State, stating 
that it must take all the necessary steps to avoid the occurrence of an event; or impose a 
duty to prosecute perpetrators of an international offence. Thus, in order to assess if a 
breach occurred, it is necessary to compare the conduct in which the State engaged with 
the one required by the international obligation
55
. 
Had this comparison taken place and it was found that a breach had occurred; being such 
violation attributable to the State, the existence of negligence or fault on the part of the 
latter, or damage to another State, is not a necessary condition for the rules on international 
state responsibility to be applicable
56
. These elements may be relevant in some cases, 
depending on the content of the obligation breached
57
. For instance, if a State is obliged 
not to adopt certain measures restraining the exporting of meat and it does so; it would be 
in breach of such international obligation, regardless of any damage suffered by an 
exporter. On the other hand, if a State is obliged not to expropriate foreign property 
without providing compensation and it does so, the damage suffered by the foreign 
investor is a relevant condition to apply the rules on State responsibility. 
However, unlike the elements of fault or damage, assessing if the conduct that caused the 
breach of the international obligation is attributable to the State is an essential condition for 
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the rules on the international responsibility of States to apply
58
. In this vein, it is generally 
accepted that there are three principles for attributing conducts to a State
59
.  
The first is that a State acts through the conduct of individuals exercising power and 
authority. Therefore, conducts of agents, organs, political sub-divisions (such as provinces) 
or successful revolutionary regimes are attributable to the State in the international order. 
Also, individuals who are not part of the structure of the State, but act under direct control 
of those in power or of those functioning as a government, are considered to be de facto 
agents and their acts are attributable to the State controlling them
60
. This principle is stated 
in the draft
61
 and it is applicable where a private company exercises a function delegated 
by the State, for example. 
According to the second principle, if an actor is not part of the structure of the State, such 
as private persons or associations, and it is also not functioning as a de facto agent, its 
conducts are not attributable to the State
62
. For instance, usually the State will not be 
responsible under international law if a mob causes damage to foreign property. 
Nonetheless, the State might be held responsible if it adopts the conduct of the mob as its 
own
63
. 
Finally, the third principle states that while the conduct of a private entity, such as a mob, 
may not be attributable to the State; it might nevertheless entail the responsibility of the 
latter under international law, where such an action is a condition to the breach of another 
obligation. For example, when the State has the duty to prosecute and punish the offenders 
with due diligence, but fails to do so
64
.  
The content of the due diligence standard mentioned is not to be found in the draft, and it 
may vary according to the primary rule within the international obligation
65
. As the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea stated in its Seabed 
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Mining Advisory Opinion, the concept of due diligence is also flexible, depending on the 
circumstances of the case and changing over time
66
. Moreover, it is connected to an 
obligation of conduct
67
, requiring that the State must do its best to achieve a particular 
result
68
. Thus, had the State done so, it would not be violating such an obligation, even if it 
had not been able to achieve a specific result.  
For the rules on international responsibility to apply, the State must not have acted in 
conformity with an international obligation attributed to it. Nevertheless, even when a State 
commits an act against the primary rule prescribed in an international obligation and this 
conduct is, in principle attributable to it, this does not necessarily imply that the act is 
wrongful. There might be a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, shielding the State 
against an otherwise sound claim for the breach of an international obligation
69
. In this 
context, the draft contains six circumstances precluding wrongfulness: consent (Article 
20), self-defense (Article 21), counter-measures (Article 22), force majeure (Article 23), 
distress (Article 24) and necessity (Article 25). 
These circumstances are to be distinguished from the internal elements within an 
international obligation
70
. For instance, Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
71
, prescribes that in order for an act to qualify as 
genocide, there must be intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group. Along with this, Article IX makes it possible for a State to be responsible 
for acts of genocide. However, had such an intent to destroy the groups mentioned been 
absent, the State would not have breached the obligation not to commit genocide
72
, 
because such a crime would not have taken place.  
The issue is distinct when it comes to a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. In the 
above-mentioned example, there was no violation of the obligation not to commit genocide 
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due to the conditions set by that obligation. On the other hand, circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness are external to the obligations. They do not annul or terminate the latter, but 
provide an excuse not to fulfill them while those circumstances remain
73
. For instance, if a 
State alleges force majeure as a reason not to fulfill an obligation, the obligation 
nevertheless subsists and such a State has to fulfill its duties the moment the circumstances 
preventing it from doing so disappear. 
Whereas it is correct to affirm that the circumstances precluding wrongfulness may allow 
the State not to act in conformity with an international obligation, this is not a valid 
affirmation in all cases. According to the Article 26 of the draft, where the obligation stems 
from a peremptory norm of general international law, such circumstances do not apply.  
These norms are defined in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT)
74
, as norms accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as being immune to derogation, capable of being modified only by a norm of 
general international law possessing the same character. For instance, the State cannot 
allege self-defense as an excuse not to act in conformity with the obligation prohibiting 
genocide, for this obligation is considered to derive from a peremptory norm of general 
international law
75
. 
 Usually, the burden of proof lies with the State which claims the breach of an international 
obligation. However, when a State invokes a circumstance precluding wrongfulness as a 
defense, the burden of proof with respect to this circumstance lies with it
76
. If such a State 
succeeds in proving a circumstance, it is nevertheless obliged, in principle, to pay a 
compensation for any material loss suffered by the injured State
77
. 
As a way of making reparation to an injury, the draft prescribes that a State must provide 
restitution (Article 35), compensation (Article 36), or satisfaction (Article 37). All these 
three categories are included in the broad concept of reparation (Article 34). In addition, all 
of them refer to reparation due to a wrongful act, which is distinct from the compensation 
                                                          
73
 Crawford. The International Law Commission´s Articles on State Responsibility Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries. p. 160. 
74
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded at Vienna 23 May 1969. 
75
 Crawford. The International Law Commission´s Articles on State Responsibility Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries. p. 188. 
76
 Ibid. p. 162. 
77
 ARSIWA. Article 27 (b). 
  
20 
referring to an act not to be considered as such, due to some circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness
78
. The State is required to make full reparation, which means that these 
categories can be used separately or in conjunction in order to achieve this goal
79
. 
Notwithstanding, they are arranged in order of preference. An example of restitution 
includes the releasing of a detained ship. Compensations may involve a financial sum 
following the damage to a vessel. Finally, satisfaction could be attained through a public 
statement recognizing the wrongful act. 
Some international obligations target the protection of the interest of a community of 
States (obligations erga omnes partes) or that of the international community as a whole 
(obligations erga omnes). In this vein, an obligation in a multilateral treaty directed to all 
States parties belongs to the first category, while the obligation not to interfere with the 
right of self- determination would be directed to the whole international community, 
belonging to the second category
80
. These obligations usually stem from peremptory norms 
of general international law and since they concern the interest of the whole international 
community or that of a group of States, even if a specific State was not directly affected by 
the violation, it nevertheless can bring a claim against the non-compliant State
81
.   
Hence, given the importance of the interests protected by these obligations, the draft allows 
States other than the one directly affected to claim reparation from the responsible State in 
the name of the former or in the name of the beneficiaries of the breached obligation. By 
the same token, it is possible for States not directly affected to claim the cessation and non-
repetition of the violation. These provisions provide additional means to protect the 
community or collective interest at stake
82
.  
These mechanisms seek to enforce compliance by the State which violated an international 
obligation. The most common instrument used for that is retorsion. The latter has been 
characterized as an “unfriendly” conduct adopted by a State not necessarily in response to 
an unlawful act. Thus, they are intrinsically lawful and are not to be found in the draft
83
. 
For instance, an economic embargo can represent a retorsion. On the other hand, although 
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counter-measures also seek to enforce compliance with an international obligation, they are 
necessarily a response to a breach of such obligation by another State. Furthermore, they 
are also a circumstance precluding wrongfulness (Article 22).  Notwithstanding, if a State 
adopts a counter-measure merely based on an assumption of a breach of an obligation, it 
may incur in a breach
84
. Furthermore, they are not to be used as a means of punishing the 
targeted State and must be employed in a way as to allow the resumption of performance 
of the obligation breached by the latter
85
.  
The secondary rules, concerning the State responsibility in the international order are 
important, since these rules can be seen as a guarantee that the States will comply with 
their international obligations. In this context, the possibility of holding States responsible 
for wrongful acts has been described as fundamental for the existence of international 
law
86
. 
The next section focuses on issues of attribution in the context of piracy. In this vein, the 
requisite of private ends in the definition of piracy under UNCLOS is analyzed in order to 
establish how this element interferes with the application of the secondary rules on State 
responsibility to piratical acts. 
4.2. On the impossibility of attributing piratical acts to States 
Historically, piracy has been characterized as a phenomenon possessing a strong anti-
authority aspect attached to it
87
. This view was exposed in the Lotus case, by the PCIJ, 
when it quoted authors who referred to pirates as, among other things, criminals who swear 
obedience to no flag and reject the State or other similar authority
88
.  
Today, it seems beyond controversy that acts of piracy cannot be attributed to States under 
the modern framework of responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts set up 
by the ILC draft
89
. This conception is rooted on the interpretation that the requirement of 
“private ends” in the definition of piracy under UNCLOS excludes acts of violence or 
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depredation at sea committed by or on behalf of an authority
90
. Such an interpretation is 
based on an objective criterion, because it draws attention to the fact that there must be no 
State sanction connected to acts of piracy, without going into the perpetrators personal 
motivations
91
.  
There is another interpretation that also excludes politically-motivated acts such as 
terrorism, from that definition of piracy. This interpretation has been characterized as 
subjective, because it addresses the motive behind the actions of the perpetrators
92
. 
Since there has not been controversy in the fact that acts of piracy cannot be attributed to 
States, it seems largely-accepted that the definition of piracy under UNCLOS does not 
encompass acts of violence or depredation at sea perpetrated on behalf of a State. 
Nevertheless, it is still debatable if such a definition excludes also politically-motivated 
acts
93
.   
Thus, the next section focus on such an interpretation of the private ends requirement 
within the definition of piracy under UNCLOS, since it has consequences on the attribution 
of acts of piracy to States. An explanation on the history of this interpretation is provided. 
Along with this, the role of the private ends element within the UNCLOS definition of 
piracy is analyzed, in order to address its precise effects regarding the impossibility of 
attributing acts of piracy to States. 
4.2.1. Excluding state-sanctioned acts from the UNCLOS definition of piracy: the 
historical path of the pirate ends requirement 
In 1924, the Assembly of the League of Nations sought to convene a Committee of Experts 
for the Progressive Codification of International Law. Piracy was one of the subjects 
selected for codification by such committee. A sub-committee composed by Rapporteur 
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Matsuda and the Chinese representative Wang Chung-Hui produced a draft treaty on 
piracy, which became known as the Matsuda Draft
94
.  
The first article of the draft excluded from its definition of piracy acts committed with a 
purely political object. At first glance, it would appear that the goal was to refer to the 
motivation of the perpetrators behind acts of violence at sea, rather than to the absence of a 
State sanction backing them. However, in a memorandum, Matsuda argued that according 
to international law, piracy would consist of acts perpetrated without authorization from 
the government of any State
95
. The Matsuda Draft was not adopted, and piracy was taken 
out of the codification list, on account of the difficulty in reaching a universal agreement 
on the subject
96
.  
This initiative carried out under the auspices of the League of Nations influenced the 
Harvard Law School to elaborate a research project aiming to contributing towards future 
codification of international law. In 1932, in the wake of such project, the Harvard Draft 
Convention on Piracy
97
 (hereafter the Harvard Draft) was released
98
.   
The Harvard Draft prescribes in its Article 3 (1) that in order for a violent act at sea to 
qualify as piracy, it must have been committed, among other things, for private ends 
without bona fide purpose of asserting a claim of right. It has been stressed that this 
requirement was included with the express intent of excluding civil war insurgents. 
Meaning that acts of violence on the high seas committed by insurgents against a vessel 
belonging to the government they seek to overthrow would be excluded from this 
definition
99
. Notwithstanding, it could be argued that this definition also excludes State-
sanctioned acts, for the examples gathered in the commentaries to the Harvard Draft 
classify as piracy, among other situations, an act of violence and plundering at sea, 
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provided such act is carried out without the authority of a State or the perpetrators are 
unrecognized insurgents
100
.  
The Harvard Draft had a significant influence on the ILC work on piracy
101
, which was 
part of the ILC´s initiative for preparing a convention on the high seas
102
, which in turn 
was responsible for bringing about the 1958 Convention on the High Seas
103
 (hereafter 
HSC). Whereas the Article 15 of the HSC does not include the bona fide element within 
the Article 3 of the Harvard Draft, it nevertheless maintains the private ends requirement 
for an act of violence or depredation to be reputed as piratical.  
There are no explanations in the commentary to the ILC articles regarding why this 
element was included in the HSC definition of piracy or what this requirement means
104
. 
During the ILC preparatory works, there was a debate on the possibility of State piracy, 
prompted by the Nationalist China´s seizure of Polish ships. However, this hypothesis was 
not endorsed
105
.  
State piracy seems to be a subject ruled out by the UNCLOS definition of piracy also, 
since according to its Article 102, if the crew of a warship or a government ship or aircraft 
has mutinied and taken control of the ship, the acts of piracy committed by the crew are 
assimilated to those perpetrated by a private ship
106
. Along with this, Article 101 maintains 
the private ends requirement.  
This historical overview was important to emphasize the exclusion of state-sanctioned acts 
from the modern definition of piracy. Arguably, the private ends element within Article 
101 of UNCLOS seems to provide the main basis for such exclusion today. But what role 
does this element play regarding the possibility of directly attributing piratical acts to 
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States? In what ways this element differs from the others within the UNCLOS definition of 
piracy, when bringing the discussion to the attribution at issue? 
4.2.2. The role of the private ends requirement and of the other requirements within 
the UNCLOS definition of piracy regarding issues of attribution 
The private ends requirement within the UNCLOS definition of piracy is capable of 
making it impossible to bring pirates under the structure of a State or to attribute piratical 
acts to States. The next section elaborates on these effects of such an element and explains 
why the latter is different from the other elements within the definition at issue. 
4.2.2.1. The function of the private ends requirement in the characterization of pirates as 
non-state actors 
It seems to be common ground that acts of piracy cannot be attributed to States under the 
framework of the rules on the draft articles concerning the responsibility of States for 
internationally wrongful acts. This view is based on the interpretation that the private ends 
element within the UNCLOS definition of piracy leads to the exclusion of state-sanctioned 
acts. The above-mentioned draft concerns acts carried out either by public agents or de 
facto State agents
107
. The latter are not part of the structure of the State, but act on its 
behalf.  Thus, piratical acts would be excluded from the draft´s ambit of application. As a 
result, pirates are to be placed in the category of non-state actors. 
Some commentators argue that pirates cannot be easily equated to non-state actors
108
. 
Perhaps this could be related to the assumption that if pirates receive some kind of support 
by the State, then their actions would not be perpetrated for pure private ends, since there 
would be authorities involved in the piratical acts. Therefore, they would not be pirates. 
However, even if this hypothesis was to be correct and the perpetrators are not pirates, 
these individuals would still be non-state actors. It is acknowledged that there might be 
links between the State and a non-state actor. This could be either through the sharing of 
ideology or in the form of some kind of support. Moreover, the essential characteristic of a 
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non-state actor is the fact that they are not agents of the State and do not act on its behalf in 
any way
109
.  
At this point, it is necessary to mention the distinction between State sponsorship and State 
support given to pirates. The first category would only be used if a State could commit 
piracy, whether by its organs or by controlling pirates. But the element of private ends 
within the UNCLOS definition of piracy turns such a situation into a mere conjecture. On 
the other hand, State support could take the form of financial help, for example. In cases of 
State sponsorship, the conduct of pirates could entail the direct responsibility of States for 
piratical acts, if not for the private ends element. Conversely, the conduct of pirates in 
cases of State support could act as a condition for the breach of another obligation, such as 
an obligation to prevent. Thus, the acts of piracy would not be directly attributable to the 
State.
110
 
If in these cases the conduct of supporting pirates is not attributable to the State, the acts of 
the individuals receiving such support would still fulfill the UNCLOS definition 
requirement of private ends, since there would be no public interest involved in such acts. 
Therefore, such acts would still be piratical and the perpetrators, in turn, would be pirates. 
This is in line with the fact that those persons financing, training or helping pirates to sell 
stolen cargo or accommodate hostages would not be State agents when carrying out these 
operations, even if they were to hold a position of authority within the structure of the 
State. This is because their conduct would be entirely private, and not attributable to a 
State, moving a step further from the category of acts beyond authority (ultra vires acts), 
which can be attributed to a State
111
. Thus, they would not be acting in their official 
capacity when doing so
112
, particularly taking into account that these activities are 
frequently carried out in secrecy. Although it is sometimes difficult to establish a 
distinction between private conducts and ultra vires acts
113
. 
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A piratical act can be turned into a generic act of violence at sea. This would be the case, 
for instance, if a State adopted the conduct of the pirates as its own, which would 
consequently entail its responsibility under the rules of the draft
114
. An example of turning 
the conduct of non-state actors into acts of State would be the situation in the Tehran 
Hostages case. In November 1979, in the wake of the Iranian Revolution which ousted the 
government of Shah Reza Pahlavi, hundreds of militants seized the US embassy and took 
the personnel hostage. According to the ICJ, in the beginning, the conduct of the militants 
was not attributable to Iran, but this situation changed after Iran decided to adopt the 
conduct of the militants as its own
115
. Had this happened in the context of piracy, the 
conduct of the perpetrators would cease to be piratical, because the private ends element 
within the UNCLOS definition of piracy excludes state-sanctioned acts of violence at sea.  
4.2.2.2. The other effect of the private ends requirement: is there a specific obligation 
prohibiting State piracy in international law? 
Although it is true that the private ends element within the UNCLOS definition of piracy 
leaves acts of piracy outside the draft´s reach, due to the impossibility of attributing 
piratical acts to States
116
, it is also correct to argue that such an element is not the only one 
making it impossible to attribute piratical acts to States. The reason is that the definition of 
piracy contains five elements,
117
 and the absence of any of them will produce the same 
result, since the presence of all five elements is essential to qualify an act as piratical.  
This happens because the function of a definition is to set boundaries, limiting the possible 
meanings of a word
118
. If, for instance, an act of violence at sea against another ship were 
committed without the sanction of any authority, but nevertheless within the territorial 
waters of a State, this act would inevitably be classified as armed robbery, and not piracy. 
Consequently, it would not be possible to attribute piratical acts to a State in this case.  
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If the absence of any of the other four elements within the UNCLOS definition of piracy 
makes it impossible to attribute acts of piracy to States, is the role of the private ends 
element special when it comes to the hypothesis of State piracy? Yes, it is. Along with 
interfering with the possibility of attributing piratical acts to States, this element also 
functions as a barrier blocking the naissance of an international obligation specifically 
prohibiting State piracy. In other words, currently in international law, there is no 
obligation with the following content: States are prohibited from committing piracy.  
An example could clarify this affirmation: Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
119
 prescribes that in order for an act to be 
classified as genocide; there must be intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group. If this element of intent within this definition is absent 
from an act of violence against any of these groups, such a crime would not have taken 
place and thus it could never be attributed to a State in this case. Nevertheless, the rule on 
Article IX of the convention, making it possible to attribute genocide to States, would 
remain intact, meaning that if the element of intent is present, such acts of violence 
towards these groups could be attributed to a State. In this context, the rule on Article IX 
permits the interpretation that there is an obligation in international law prohibiting State 
genocide, which exists separately from the definition of genocide, despite the fact that the 
latter is an essential part of the content of that obligation.  
This is possible because there is no element within the definition of genocide excluding 
state-sanctioned acts from its meaning. Conversely, when it comes to the largely-accepted 
interpretation of the private ends element within the definition of piracy, it is arguable that 
the latter makes it impossible in today´s international law for an obligation prohibiting 
State piracy to exist. This is because under the UNCLOS definition, which reflects 
customary international law, if there is a mark of authority behind acts of violence at sea, 
even if they fulfill all the other four requirements within this definition, acts of piracy 
would not have taken place. 
This implies that these acts would not be piratical if they contain a trace of authority and, 
therefore, could not be attributed to the State as such. Thus, in order for these acts to be 
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attributed to the State, it is necessary to find an international obligation making this 
possible, for in this case there would be a breach of an obligation to be attributable to the 
State.  
4.3. Alternatives for holding the State directly responsible for acts that 
would be piratical, if not for the mark of authority 
Due to the private ends element within UNCLOS definition of piracy, the presence of State 
sanction makes it impossible to characterize an act of violence at sea as piratical. As a 
result, piratical acts cannot be attributable to the State. By the same token, there is no 
international obligation specifically prohibiting State piracy. Notwithstanding, such acts 
would still fall under the generic category of acts of violence at sea. Arguably, given the 
fact that international law prohibits unauthorized acts of violence as such, these acts would 
still be attributable to States, but not as piratical ones. 
4.3.1. Grounds for the prohibition of unauthorized acts of violence at sea in 
international law 
In the case that became known as the SS Mayaguez incident, the US-flagged merchant 
vessel SS Mayaguez was fired upon, seized and boarded by Cambodian naval forces on the 
high seas near the Poulo Wai islands in 1975. President Gerald Ford declared that the 
incident was an act of piracy
120
. The Cambodian authorities, in turn, stated that the 
merchant vessel was being used for espionage. This incident could not be classified as 
piracy under the UNCLOS definition because of the absence of the private ends element 
due to the mark of authority behind the act
121
. In such cases, these acts would be classified 
as generic acts of violence at sea. Thus, it is necessary to determine if the State can be hold 
directly responsible for these acts under international law. 
Violence at sea can take the form of unauthorized use of force, for example. The latter is 
not directly regulated by UNCLOS, but general international customary law prohibits the 
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use of force in an inconsistent manner
122
, as it is stated in Article 2 (4) of the UN 
Charter
123
. In this vein, as ruled by ITLOS in the case M/V Saiga, although UNCLOS does 
not contain express provisions on the use of force concerning the seizure of ships, 
international law can be applied to these situations, according to Article 293 of the 
convention
124
. This case concerned a claim brought by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
against Guinea before that tribunal. This was on account of the seizure of the M/V Saiga, 
an oil tanker registered pursuant to the laws of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
125
. The 
tribunal considered that Guinea used excessive force when seizing the vessel in its 
exclusive economic zone. The reason is that the Guinean authorities resorted to gunfire 
without issuing any previous warning, and they also engaged in unauthorized use of force 
when boarding the tanker, violating the rights of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines under 
international law
126
. In its decision, the tribunal also took into account the fact that the M/V 
Saiga was an unarmed vessel, almost fully laden with gas and oil, with a maximum speed 
of 10 knots
127
. 
According to international law, not only an act of unauthorized use of force is prohibited, 
but also acts of unjustified damage against ships. For instance, according to the Convention 
on Intervention on the High Seas in the Case of Oil Pollution Casualties
128
, States parties 
may take measures to prevent harmful consequences stemming from oil pollution. But the 
measures adopted must be proportional and necessary, taking into account the threat or the 
actual damage. Moreover, the State which engages in an excessive and unauthorized use of 
such measures is obliged to pay compensation for the damage caused
129
. Hence, according 
to the convention, a patrol vessel of a coastal State might take measures that could cause 
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damage to a ship on the high seas, but these measures would not be necessarily unlawful, 
depending on the context
130
.  
However, even if such measures were considered to be unlawful, such acts would not be 
characterized as piratical, since the private ends requirement within the UNCLOS 
definition of piracy would be absent. This is because the patrol vessel at issue would still 
be acting in order to prevent the pollution of the coastal State waters, which denotes the 
presence of public interest. 
In light of these examples, it can be stressed that international law prohibits unlawful acts 
of violence at sea perpetrated by or on behalf of States. Thus, if an act, as such, fulfills all 
the other elements within the UNCLOS definition of piracy, except for the private ends 
requirement, a State could be held responsible, but not for acts of piracy. The same would 
be true if an act of violence, despite falling outside the ambit of the mentioned definition, 
interfered with the freedom of navigation of another State, provided that the conduct of the 
perpetrators could be attributed to the State or that the State failed with its obligation to 
prevent
131
. The freedom of navigation is recognized as a general principle of international 
law
132
 and according to UNCLOS, it applies to both the high seas and the EEZ
133
. 
Another reason for holding States directly responsible for unlawful acts of violence at sea, 
which would not consist of piracy because of State sanction, is that piracy is a sub-category 
of these acts, because the first element within the UNCLOS definition of piratical acts 
makes reference to any illicit act of violence or detention or any act of depredation
134
.  
The other four elements within such definition narrow down these acts of violence, so as to 
place them in a sub-category of unlawful acts of violence at sea. This explains why, for 
instance, according to the IMO, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA)
135
 can be applied to piratical acts
136
. 
                                                          
130
 I. A. Shearer. Problems of Jurisdiction and Law Enforcement Against Delinquent Vessels, in Law of the 
Sea. ed. Donald R. Rothwell. UK: Edward Elgar. 2013. pp. 662-663. 
131
 Tullio Treves. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the Oil and Gas Industry. Second 
International Oil and Gas Conference – Managing Risk – Dispute Avoidance and Resolution. London 20-21 
September 2007. p. 9.  
132
 Tanaka. The International Law of the Sea. p.16. 
133
 UNCLOS. Articles 87 (1) and 58 (1). 
134
 See Chapter 2. Section 2.1. 
135
 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 
Convention), adopted in Rome 10 March 1988. 
  
32 
Hence, it is important to assess if this convention could also be an alternative for holding 
States directly responsible for acts of violence at sea that are not piratical, on account of 
State sanction behind such conducts. 
4.3.2. Is SUA an alternative in this context? 
On October 7, 1985, the Achille Lauro, an Italian-flagged cruise ship, was hijacked by four 
Palestinians who were on board the ship, posing as tourists. These men held the passengers 
hostages and threatened to kill them in order to compel Israel to release 50 Palestinian 
prisoners. One of the passengers was killed in the incident and the cruise ship was on the 
high seas when the passengers were being held by the Palestinians
137
. This incident 
prompted the adoption of the SUA convention
138
, because it highlighted that the UNCLOS 
definition of piracy was inapplicable to this case, since the offence was not committed 
against another ship
139
. 
Although the preamble of this convention refers to terrorism, and it does not make explicit 
reference to piracy, SUA has a much broader scope that allows it to be applicable to 
piratical acts. Its provisions cover unlawful and intentional acts ranging from the seizure of 
a ship by intimidation or the commitment of violence against a person on board a ship, to 
the placing of a substance in a ship with intent to either destroy the ship or its cargo, which 
are committed on one ship only, or against another ship, and threaten the safety of 
navigation of the vessel
140
. Not only the commission of such acts, but also attempts, acts of 
incitation and complicity are covered by the convention
141
.  
SUA does not require that these offences must be committed against another ship, on the 
high seas or for private ends. Nevertheless, the convention does not have an unlimited 
scope: it is only applicable to ships navigating or scheduled to navigate into, through, or 
from waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single State, or beyond the 
lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States. In addition, the convention is also 
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applicable in cases where the offender is found in the territory of a State party to the 
convention, even if the former territorial condition does not apply
142
. 
Moreover, SUA is inapplicable to war ships or to ships own or operated by a State, when 
being used as a naval auxiliary or for customs or police purposes. Along with this, the 
convention prescribes that nothing on it will affect the immunity of warships or 
government ships operated for non-commercial purposes
143
. These rules deal only with 
matters of jurisdiction, it looks inaccurate to interpret them in a way as to draw the 
conclusion that state-sanctioned acts fall outside the scope of the convention.  
Notwithstanding, during the preparatory works for SUA, Kuwait advanced a proposal to 
include the possibility of applying the convention to a person who perpetrates an offence 
on behalf of a State, but this proposal was rejected. Iran, Nicaragua and Saudi Arabia 
proposed that the convention should deal with offences committed by governments, but 
this hypothesis was also not included in the convention
144
. Nonetheless, it does not imply 
that an act carried out by or on behalf of States, which is neither piracy under UNCLOS, 
nor an offence under SUA, because of the mark of authority behind it, could not be 
attributable to a State. For instance, in a situation similar to the Achille Lauro incident, if 
the conducts of the perpetrators were adopted by their State of nationality afterwards, such 
acts would be attributable to the latter, according to customary international law
145
. On the 
other hand, it means that although SUA does not contain a private ends element, it seems 
that this was meant to include only politically-motivated acts, and not state-sanctioned 
ones. 
4.3.3. The Hostages Convention alternative 
Unlike SUA, the Hostages Convention
146
 can be applied to acts that would be attributable 
to the State, if not for the private ends element within the UNCLOS definition of piracy. 
According to this convention, any person who seizes, or detain, or threatens to injure or to 
kill another individual in order to compel a third party to act in a certain way, so as to 
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release the victim, commits the offence of taking of hostages. Attempts and complicity are 
also covered by the convention
147
. But the convention is not applicable where these acts 
are committed in the territory of a single State, the alleged offender and the victims are 
nationals of that State and the offender is found within the territory of that State
148
. 
Given the fact that piratical acts might involve the taking of a foreign crew as hostage in 
order to compel a third party to pay a ransom, this convention can be applied in the context 
of piracy
149
. For instance, in February 2015, the Kalamos, a Greek supertanker was 
attacked by Nigerian pirates, some 60 nautical miles east of Bonny, Nigeria. The armed 
pirates boarded the ship armed, killed one person and took three hostages, two of them 
Greeks
150
. What if similar acts were sanctioned by a State? 
Although this convention does not contain an explicit provision on the possibility of the 
perpetration of these offences by or on behalf of a State
151, the expression “any person” 
within the definition of the hostage taking offence
152
 encompasses acts committed whether 
by de facto or de jure State agents and the draftsmen intended to include this 
interpretation
153
. Hence, if an act of violence at sea, resulting in hostage taking, is carried 
out by or on behalf of a State, the latter can be held directly responsible under the Hostages 
Convention. 
These lines dealt with alternatives to hold States directly responsible, under international 
law, for acts that would be piratical, if not for the absence of the private ends element 
within the UNCLOS definition of piracy. The following sections address the possibility of 
holding States indirectly responsible for piratical acts.  
4.4. Attributing piratical acts to States in an indirect manner  
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It seems impossible to attribute piratical acts to States under current customary 
international law due to the private ends element within the UNCLOS definition of piracy. 
Nonetheless, alternatives can be used to hold the state directly responsible for state-
sanctioned acts of violence at sea. Those acts cannot be attributed to the State as piracy, 
because of the mark of authority they bear. Still, in these situations, the conduct of the 
offenders would be directly attributed to the State, provided these individuals acted as de 
jure or de facto State agents. 
Notwithstanding, piratical acts can be indirectly attributed to States. In these situations, the 
conduct of the pirates would not be attributed to the States in a direct manner, but would be 
a condition to assess the breach of another obligation imposed on the State. Thus, the 
piratical acts would function as a catalyst, allowing the attribution to the State of a conduct 
committed by the latter, and not in conformity with an international obligation
154
. For 
instance, if the State has a duty to prevent an illicit activity and its organs fail to comply 
with this obligation, the conduct of such organs will be directly attributed to that State. 
However, in order for the breach of such an obligation to take place, the conduct of the 
individuals engaged in the illicit activity is also relevant, despite not being attributable to 
the State
155
. In this context, is there any international obligation capable of making it 
possible to hold States indirectly responsible for piracy? 
4.4.1.  Grounds for holding States indirectly responsible for piracy 
Under international law, States are obliged not to allow their territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other States, as the ICJ stated in the Corfu Channel case
156
. In 
1946, the British warships Saumarez and Volage were sailing through a channel previously 
swept for mines in the North Corfu Strait, within Albanian territory, when mines exploded. 
As a result, some British men lost their lives and the ships were severely damaged
157
. 
Although the court could not infer that Albania was responsible for placing the mines in 
the channel
158
, it nevertheless concluded that the Albanian authorities knew about the 
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existence of such a minefield. Among other things, the ICJ stated that the Albanian 
government kept a close watch over the waters of the North Corfu Channel on a regular 
basis when the explosions took place. In this context, the court advanced that the 
minelaying could not have taken place without the knowledge of Albania, for the presence 
of some look posts in its coast made it possible to see an operation as such
159
. Hence, the 
ICJ held Albania responsible for breaching the international obligation of notifying, for the 
benefit of shipping in general, about the minefield in the channel, and of warning the 
approaching British warships about the imminent danger to which they were exposed when 
sailing through those waters
160
. 
In this case, Albania was not held directly responsible for the explosions, as it would have 
been the situation had the court found the State responsible for the minelaying. Instead, the 
latter functioned as a catalyst for the breach of the obligation to prevent the damage and 
loss of life caused by the explosions. The ICJ acknowledged that it would have been 
difficult or perhaps impossible for Albania to notify all States before the time of the 
explosions, but still pointed out that the Albanian authorities should have immediately 
taken all the necessary steps to warn ships near the danger zone
161
. 
In view of the ruling of the ICJ in the above-mentioned case, it seems possible to affirm 
that the obligation to prevent the damage to the warships consists of an obligation of 
conduct, subject to a due diligence standard. The latter imposes on the State the duty to 
take all the necessary steps to avoid a certain result. In these cases, the State is not obliged 
to absolutely guarantee that a certain event will not occur, but instead it must exercise its 
best efforts in order to avoid a particular outcome
162
. 
The general obligation stated by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case, imposing on States the 
duty not to allow knowingly their territories to be used for activities that may harm the 
rights of other States is applicable to piracy. This is because the latter, despite happening 
outside the territorial waters of the State, requires the presence of an infrastructure on 
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land
163
. Additionally, pirate attacks can have an effect on both the property and the 
freedom of navigation of other States, along with the physical integrity of their nationals. 
If, for instance, the State exercises due diligence in patrolling its territorial waters, it can 
prevent both piracy and armed robbery.  
4.4.2.  The due diligence standard and the obligation to prevent in the context of   
piracy 
A State is not obliged to prevent the commission of illicit activities in its territory in 
absolute terms. Rather, the standard of due diligence requires that the State must do its best 
to avoid the commitment of illicit activities that may affect the rights of other States, taking 
into account what the State knew (or ought to have known), and its capacity to act, given 
the circumstances in a particular case. In other words, the due diligence standard comprises 
two elements: knowledge and capacity
164
. 
The first imposes on the State the obligation to act diligently once it has knowledge that 
harm could be caused to the rights of other States
165
. In the Corfu Channel case, for 
instance, Albania should have warned the shipping in general and the British warships 
once it had knowledge of the minefield in the channel. This requirement is not one of 
subjective knowledge, meaning that the Albanian State agents, for example, knew about 
the minefield; but the proof of knowledge is objective in the sense that, among other 
things, constant surveillance and the presence of lookout posts in the Albanian coast 
allowed the ICJ to infer that the Albania knew, or ought to have known, of the 
minefield
166
.  
In order to establish the breach of the obligation to prevent, along with knowledge, the 
State must have the capacity to act in a way as to avoid a particular outcome. This element 
encompasses three different aspects: institutional, resource and territorial capacity
167
.  
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Institutional capacity involves the legal regime and criminal law enforcement framework 
that the State possesses in order to prevent a result
168
. In the context of piracy, it is 
important to mention that the offence of piracy is defined in UNCLOS
169
, but the penalty 
for committing such an offence is to be found within the domestic laws of States
170
. 
Moreover, UNCLOS does not impose on States the obligation to enact laws on piracy. In 
this vein, the domestic laws of some countries follow the UNCLOS definition of piracy; in 
other States, piratical acts are subsumed in categories like kidnapping, robbery, abduction 
and violence against persons
171
. Nevertheless, once the State has knowledge that its 
national, to be found in its territory, has committed such an offence according to its 
domestic law, it has the duty to act diligently so as to prosecute and punish the offender
172
. 
Along with having the necessary legal framework to act, the State must have the financial, 
technical and human resources to put its institutional apparatus to good use
173
. In the Gulf 
of Guinea, for instance, it is acknowledged that some coastal States lack the financial and 
technical resources to patrol their coasts. Cameroon, for instance, has established a public-
private partnership, with a private outfit, the Rapid Intervention Battalion (RIB-Delta), in 
order to provide protection for ships and oil platforms within its maritime domain
174
. This 
initiative can curb both piracy and armed robbery. Nonetheless, a State will be in breach of 
the obligation to prevent piracy if, for example, despite not having the resources to 
diligently patrol its territorial waters, it nevertheless turns a blind eye to the fact that its 
naval forces are involved in piracy or its police is giving protection to pirates
175
. 
Lastly, the capacity element also involves a territorial aspect. Whenever the State exercises 
a sufficient degree of control over its territory, including its territorial waters, it is obliged 
to act diligently in order to prevent acts of piracy. However, in the extreme situation where 
                                                          
168
 Ibid. p. 71. 
169
 UNCLOS. Article. 101. 
170
 Robert C. Beckman. The piracy regime under UNCLOS: problems and prospects for cooperation, in 
Piracy and International Maritime Crimes in ASEAN prospects for cooperation. ed. Robert C. Beckman. 
Ashley J. Roach. UK: Edward Elgar. 2012. p. 18. 
171
  Ibid. p. 33. 
172
 Mazzeschi. The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of International Responsibility of States. p. 29. 
173
 Trapp. State Responsibility for International Terrorism Problems and Prospects.  p. 71. 
174
 Charles Ukeje. Wullson Mvomo Ela. African Approaches to Maritime Security – The Gulf of Guinea. 
Nigeria: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 2013. p. 21. 
175
 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1.1. 
  
39 
it lacks control over any part of its territory, the State cannot be held responsible for its 
failure to prevent an illicit activity, as long as this situation persists
176
.  
Notwithstanding, the State may have control over part of its territory and may be held 
responsible for acts committed therein, provided it failed to act diligently
177
.  An example 
is Somalia, a country considered to be a fragile State
178
, where the degree of stability and 
State control varies among different regions. In Somaliland, there is a relatively high 
degree of stability. In Puntland and Central Somalia, such a degree is intermediary. Finally, 
in Southern Somalia, absolute instability remains
179
. Since piracy needs infrastructure, 
coupled with a certain degree of stability to flourish, areas such as Puntland and Central 
Somalia function as the ideal pirate anchorage
180
. In these pirate anchorages, local 
authorities would be under a less strict standard of due diligence to prevent acts of piracy 
than it would have been the case if such acts happened in Somaliland. Whereas it could be 
argued that the authorities based in Southern Somalia would not have the necessary 
capacity to act, due to Somalia´s lack of control over this part of its territory. 
All the same, this would not imply that even in these more instable regions, Somalia would 
not be in breach of the obligation to prevent if, for example, local authorities are 
participating in organizing or financing pirates. In 2013, President Hassan Mohamud 
granted amnesty to low-level pirates, but not to the financiers or organizers of acts of 
piracy
181
. This gesture signalizes that Somalia considers such conducts intolerable. 
However, Somalia would violate its duty to prevent pirate attacks if authorities in these 
regions, although not acting in their official capacity or on behalf of the State, are directly 
involved in such activities. This is because these individuals would be supporting 
pirates
182
.  
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4.4.2.1.   Distinguishing between general obligations of conduct subject to a due diligence 
standard and pure obligations to prevent 
Obligations of conduct subject to a due diligence standard require that the State must 
employ its best effort in order to avoid a particular outcome. Thus, there would be a breach 
even if the event did not occur, provided that the State did not take the necessary steps to 
avoid the result. On the other hand, although pure obligations to prevent also require a 
standard of due diligence, the State would not commit a violation unless the event to be 
avoided occurs. Thus, in these cases, the State would only be in breach of such an 
obligation if it failed to act diligently and the outcome to be avoided occurred
183
. Such a 
distinction was stated by the ICJ in the Bosnian Genocide case
184
. 
An example of a due diligence standard obligation of conduct is that enshrined in 
UNCLOS, requiring States to cooperate to the fullest possible extent to repress piracy on 
the high seas or no-jurisdiction zones
185
. The expression “fullest possible extent” means 
that States must employ their best effort to cooperate and act diligently to repress piracy. In 
this context, a State would arguably be in breach of such an obligation if, for instance, it 
does not share information with other States in an area prone to piracy and fails to inform 
another State about a possible pirate attack, even if such attack does not occur
186
. During 
the preparatory works for UNCLOS, the delegation of Malta proposed that the duty to 
prevent should be included in such provision, but this proposal was rejected
187
.  
A pure obligation to prevent can be found in SUA, requiring all States parties to take all 
practicable measures to prevent preparations in their territories, aiming to perpetrate the 
offences established in the convention within or outside such territorial boundaries
188
. The 
expression “all practicable measures” imposes a due diligence standard on States, requiring 
the latter to employ their best effort. Nevertheless, unless a State failure to act diligently 
results in the commission of one of the offences enshrined in the convention, it would not 
be in breach of this obligation. Although this provision in SUA has been criticized on 
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account of its vagueness, organizing, financing or training pirates are among the conducts 
which can be considered preparations for the commitment of the offences enshrined in the 
convention
189
. 
Arguably, even if a State prone to piracy has not ratified SUA, it is nevertheless obliged 
under customary international law to prevent the preparations for the commitment of illicit 
activities within its territory which may violate the rights of other States, as the ICJ ruled in 
the Corfu Channel case. Piracy occurs outside the territorial boundaries of a State. 
However, the preparations aiming to commit piracy are land-based and are also suitable for 
the perpetration of armed robbery. Additionally, both illicit activities can cause harm to 
other States. Moreover, under customary international law, the State is obliged to 
safeguard, on its territory, including its territorial waters, the security of aliens and their 
property
190
. In this vein, a State not only has the duty to refrain from taking measures that 
could jeopardize the security of foreigners, but it also has the duty to protect aliens from 
harm stemming from non-state actors, such as pirates
191
. 
Thus, it could be argued that the States which are not parties to SUA are obliged, under 
international law, to exercise due diligence in order to prevent preparatory acts within their 
territories aiming to perpetrate of acts of violence at sea. In some cases, the acts of 
organizing and financing pirates are not crimes under domestic law
192
. Nonetheless, the 
obligation to prevent is international, meaning that the legality or illegality of the conduct 
giving rise to the breach must be assessed in light of the sources available in international 
law
193
.  
4.4.2.2.  The due diligence standard and the counter-piracy operations off the Somali Coast: 
are States obliged to accept external help? 
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Currently, naval operations in Somalia function as counter-piracy initiatives. The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) contributes to providing maritime security in the 
region through Operation Ocean Shield, for instance. Other similar initiatives include the 
European Union-led Operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR), the multinational Combined Task 
Force 151 (CTF-151) and individual contributors, such as China, India and South Korea
194
. 
These operations act according to the legal framework set up by some resolutions of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter, which deals with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of 
aggression
195
. Two of them need further comments: these are the UNSC resolution 1816 
and the UNSC resolution 1851.  
Resolution 1816 was adopted in 2008, following a request of the Transitional Federal 
Government of Somalia (TFG), in the wake of Somalia´s lack of capacity to deter pirate 
attacks. In this vein, the resolution authorizes states and regional organizations cooperating 
with the TFG for the repression of piracy to enter the territorial waters of Somalia, so as to 
repress acts of piracy and armed robbery, for a period of six months from its adoption. On 
the other hand, this resolution explicitly prescribes that such measures are applicable only 
to the situation in Somalia and must neither affect the rights of other States, nor establish 
customary international law
196
. 
A few months later, the UNSC adopted resolution 1851, which reaffirmed all the 
provisions within resolution 1816 and authorized land operations in Somalia, for a period 
of twelve months from the date of adoption of resolution 1846. The latter renewed the 
UNSC resolution 1816
197
. 
On November 2014, the UNSC resolution 2184, renewed such authorizations for a period 
of twelve months from its adoption, and, again, advanced that its provisions are applicable 
                                                          
194
 NATO. Counter-piracy operations. 26 Mar 2015 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48815.htm. 
195
 United Nations Charter. Article 39. 
196
 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1816, adopted by the Security Council in its 5902nd Meeting on 2 June 
2008, para 7 and 9. 
197
 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1851, adopted by the Security Council in its 6046th Meeting on 16 
December 2008, para 6 and 10. 
  
43 
only to the situation in Somalia and cannot be considered as establishing customary 
international law
198
. 
In this context, would a State be in breach of the obligation to prevent pirate attacks if it 
lacks capacity to comply with such an obligation and yet refuses to accept external help, as 
it was once stated by a legal commentator
199
? 
Not surprisingly, the lack of capacity of a State can contribute to increasing the number of 
pirate attacks and to jeopardizing the lives of seafarers. In this context, a 2013 World Bank 
report suggests that as many as 3.741 crewmembers of 125 different nationalities were 
victims of Somali pirates, some of these victims were reportedly held in captivity for 
periods as long as 1.718 days. It also stated that 82 to 97 seafarers have died as a 
consequence of such attacks
200
. Notwithstanding, it seems hard to argue that a Somali 
refusal to accept external help could amount to a breach of its obligation to prevent these 
attacks. 
As the ICJ stated in the Bosnian Genocide case, if the obligation to prevent is one of 
conduct, subject to a due diligence standard, a State is not obliged to succeed in avoiding a 
particular result, irrespective of the circumstances. Rather, a State is obliged to employ all 
means available, and within its power to avoid a particular outcome
201
. Thus, in order to 
assess if a State breached its obligation to prevent a pirate attack, attention must be drawn 
to that State´s own particularities. Therefore, a State would never violate the obligation to 
prevent pirate attacks because it refused external help to curb them. If, for instance, a State 
lacks the capacity to effectively patrol its territorial waters, it would not violate the 
obligation to prevent if a pirate attack occurs. This would be the case whether a State 
chooses to accept external help or not. 
Arguably, holding States responsible for breaching the obligation to prevent on account of 
their refusal to accept external help despite their lack of capacity to avoid an undesired 
outcome, would contribute to eroding the element of capacity within the due diligence 
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standard. Moreover, this could be an incentive for fragile States, like Somalia, to distrust 
not only international law, but also the whole international community.  This situation 
would not be in line with the goal behind the UNSC resolutions authorizing the naval 
operations off the Somali coast. For instance, the preamble of resolution 1816 reaffirms the 
respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of 
Somalia. It also takes into account the request of the TFG, asking for the international 
community´s assistance to address the issue of the escalating pirate attacks
202
. Hence, it 
could be inferred from the resolution´s preamble that the goal behind its adoption is the 
cooperation between a fragile State and the international community. 
This cooperation would be inevitably weakened if a State were to be held responsible 
irrespective of the circumstances and regardless of its particular situation. Along with this, 
holding States responsible for more than they in reality are can contribute to diminishing 
the function of the rules on State responsibility to act as a mechanism to ensure the efficacy 
of international law
203
. 
4.4.2.3.  The dry aspect of piracy: external help from naval operations does not discharge a 
State from the obligation to prevent pirate attacks 
Piracy happens on the high seas and the EEZ, but the occurrence of pirate attacks is 
connected to a network on land. Pirates need an infrastructure to organize piratical acts, 
and to anchor hijacked ships or accommodate hostages. For example, it has been suggested 
that in Central Somalia, as soon as a hijacked vessel was brought to the coastal waters of a 
given district, pirates had to pay an anchorage fee. Allegedly, the receivers of such fees 
were city administrators, businessmen, militia leaders and regional government officials
204
. 
Thus, a State, such as Somalia, would be obliged to exercise its duty to diligently prevent 
pirate attacks, not only by patrolling its territorial waters, but also by addressing the 
network of pirates on land. Hence, the external help that naval operations offer only tackles 
part of the problem. This could explain why it has been reported that there could be a new 
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outbreak of pirate attacks off the Somali coast in spite of the naval operations therein
205
. In 
this context, the other half of the issue could be addressed through the enhancement of the 
country´s capacity, through improving its infrastructure and institutions. Nevertheless, 
corruption within the Somali State, and particularly the involvement of local authorities 
with pirates, can undermine capacity-building initiatives and the goal to successfully 
repress piracy
206
. 
A State´s lack of capacity, bringing about the need for external help, such as in the case of 
Somalia, could shield that State against a claim for violating the obligation to diligently act 
to prevent pirate attacks. This capacity deficit, on the other hand, cannot be regarded as a 
barrier, blocking, for example, the possibility of holding Somalia responsible for breaching 
the obligation to prevent if Somali authorities engage in direct cooperation with pirates, 
although not acting in their official capacity when doing so
207
.  
4.5. Concluding remarks 
The interpretation leading to the conclusion that the private ends element within the 
UNCLOS definition of piracy
208
 excludes state-sanctioned acts seems to be well 
accepted
209
. However, some commentators criticize such an approach, arguing that under 
many past interpretations of customary international law, some acts of violence at sea 
committed by States would have been piracy
210
. Notwithstanding, there seems to be room 
to affirm that state-sanctioned acts cannot be considered piratical. Many previous 
interpretations of the private ends requirement, in different situations, sought to exclude 
acts bearing the mark of authority from the category of piratical ones
211
. As a result of 
these interpretations, state-sanctioned acts of violence at sea can never be attributed to a 
State as piracy. 
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All the same, as it has been argued in the study
212
, the absence of any element within the 
UNCLOS definition of piracy can contribute to the impossibility of attributing acts of 
violence at sea as piracy to a State. In this vein, the difference between the private ends 
element and the other elements within this definition is that the former blocks the 
naissance of an international obligation specifically prohibiting States from committing 
piracy. This means that: on the one hand, the rules on State responsibility are not affected 
by this interpretation of the private ends element. On the other hand, it nevertheless brings 
about the necessity of an extra effort of interpretation, in order to find which international 
obligation has been violated by the State. However, this situation could be altered through 
the adoption of bilateral or multilateral agreements and the inclusion of state-sanctioned 
acts in their definition of piracy. However, this option does not seem to reflect the current 
trend, since regional agreements aiming to combat piracy, such as the ReCCAP and the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct follow the UNCLOS definition
213
. 
States can be held responsible for acts of violence at sea which would fall under the 
category of piratical acts, if not for the private ends requirement within the UNCLOS 
definition of piracy. These acts could, for instance, consist of unauthorized use of force, 
which could be attributed to the State. This was the situation in the M/V Saiga case where 
ITLOS held Guinea responsible for using excessive force during the seizure of a Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines-flagged vessel
214
. Along with this, some treaties, such as the 
Hostages Convention, could be used to hold a State responsible in cases where the 
kidnapping of crew members is carried out by or on behalf of a State
215
. Such acts are not 
attributed to the State as piratical under UNCLOS, but as acts of violence prescribed in 
another convention or under customary international law. 
Nevertheless, piratical acts can be indirectly attributed to States, where these acts function 
as a catalyst for the violation of another international obligation, such as an obligation to 
prevent pirate attacks
216
. Obligations to prevent are subject to a due diligence standard, 
meaning that the State is not required to succeed in avoiding an undesired result, but must 
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employ its best efforts in order to avoid a particular outcome
217
. In order to assess if a State 
acted diligently, one must analyze if a State had knowledge and available means in order to 
fulfill its duty
218
. In this vein, a State is required to put its capacity to good use. If a State 
lacks the capacity to act, it will not be in breach of the obligation to prevent a pirate attack. 
By the same token, that State will never violate such an obligation if, despite its capacity 
deficit, it refuses to accept external help coming from the international community. 
Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that the function of the rules on the 
international responsibility of States is to promote stability and respect for international 
law. This goal will hardly be achieved if States are held responsible for more than they in 
fact are
219
. 
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5.  CONCLUSION  
The study sought to analyze the possibility of attributing acts of piracy, either directly or 
indirectly to States according to the rules on State responsibility in international law. In 
this vein, it can be argued that due to the private ends element within the UNCLOS 
definition of piracy, States can never commit piratical acts in today´s international law. 
Nevertheless, such acts can, for example, be indirectly attributed to States, if the latter 
violate an obligation to prevent pirate attacks. 
Such an attempt draws attention to the dry aspect of piracy, because pirates need a land 
network in order to carry out with their operations. In this context, as it was shown in the 
study, there have been reports concerning the involvement of some State authorities with 
pirates. Therefore, assessing in which ways States can be held responsible for acts of 
piracy is of great importance not only for international and maritime law practitioners, but 
also for those involved in the shipping industry. 
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